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We have been reliably informed by practitioners that police officers and intelligence
officers across the world have started to use theModel Statement lie detection technique.
In this article we introduce this technique. We describe why it works, report the empirical
evidence that it works, and outline how to use it. Research examining the Model
Statement only started recently and more research is required. We give suggestions
for future research with the technique. The Model Statement technique is one of many
recently developed verbal lie detectionmethods.We start this article with a short overview
of the—in our view- most promising recent developments in verbal lie detection before
turning our attention to the Model Statement technique.
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VERBAL LIE DETECTION
DePaulo et al.’s (1) comprehensive meta-analysis of nonverbal and verbal cues to deception showed
that such cues are generally weak and unreliable (2). Research has also suggested that this applies
more to nonverbal cues than to verbal cues to deception: Ameta-analysis about observers’ ability to
detect deceit when observing nonverbal and verbal cues to deception showed that when observers
could only see the target person, they performed worse (52% accuracy) than when they could
only hear the target person (63%) (3). This relative weakness of nonverbal cues to deceit could
at least in part be explained when taking into account the strategies truth tellers and liars use
when attempting to make a convincing impression on others. Truth tellers and liars employ similar
strategies regarding nonverbal behavior: Both try to suppress signs of nervousness and attempt to
replace themwith signs that will create the impression of being honest, such as looking conversation
partners into their eyes and avoiding fidgeting (scratching head, wrists etc.) (4, 5). In contrast, truth
tellers and liars use different strategies regarding verbal behavior. Truth tellers are forthcoming and
employ a “tell it all” strategy, whereas liars employ a “keep it simple” strategy and avoid mentioning
incriminating details (6, 7). As a consequence, truthful stories often include more details than
deceptive stories (1, 8).
Because researchers found nonverbal cues to be ineffective to detect deception, they refocused
their efforts to focus on verbal cues. Particularly, they have tried to elicit or enhance verbal cues
through specific interview techniques that exploit the different verbal strategies that truth tellers
and liars employ (9). In our view, four of these efforts have shown the best results or the best
potential in terms of lie detection (10, 11): (a) The Strategic Use of Evidence, (b) Assessment Criteria
Indicative of Deception, (c) the Verifiability Approach, and (d) Cognitive Credibility Assessment,
to which the Model Statement technique belongs. We outline these approaches briefly and refer to
Vrij (10, 11) and Vrij and Fisher (12) for further details.
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Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE)
The aim of the SUE technique is to exploit the different
strategies truth tellers and liars employ in interviews, particularly
the difference in between forthcoming (truth tellers) and
avoiding mentioning incriminating details (liars) (6, 13). In
a SUE interview, the investigator asks questions related to
the evidence s/he possesses without making the interviewee
aware of possessing this evidence (i.e., asking about someone’s
whereabouts without revealing that CCTV footage showed that
the suspect was in a shopping mall where a robbery took
place). This typically leads to truth tellers’ accounts being more
consistent with the available evidence than liars’ accounts (14).
In addition, during an interview liars sometimes start to realize
that the interviewer may have some evidence against them (i.e.,
CCTV footage about being in the shoppingmall). Liars then often
change their statement and provide an innocent explanation for
the evidence (i.e., admitting for the first time to have been in the
shopping mall, but not admitting to have been in the shop where
the robbery took place). Such changes in liars’ stories are called
within-statements inconsistencies and liars show more of them
than truth tellers (14).
Assessment Criteria Indicative of
Deception (ACID)
The ACID interview procedure is based on the Cognitive
Interview, a well-established protocol to elicit more information
from cooperative witnesses through enhancing three processes:
Social dynamics, memory/cognition and communication (15). In
ACID, truth tellers and liars provide an initial free recall followed
by instructions that stimulate communication and aid memory
(16). An example of communication stimulation used in ACID
is transfer of control to the respondent, and three examples of
memory aids used in ACID are mental reinstatement of context,
recall from another person’s perspective, and reverse-order recall.
ACID research has shown that, amongst other findings, truth
tellers report more additional information after the initial free
recall than liars (16, 17).
Verifiability Approach (VA)
The VA is based on the idea that liars face a dilemma. On the
one hand, liars prefer to provide many details. This makes sense
because the more details someone provides, the more likely it
is that s/he will be believed (18, 19). On the other hand, liars
do not wish to mention too many details. The more details
they provide, the more opportunity they give to investigators to
check these details and to discover their lies (19). A strategy that
incorporates both seemingly conflicting goals is to provide details
that cannot be verified (20). Indeed, research has shown that truth
tellers typically report more details that can be checked than liars
(21). Checkable details are activities that someone claims to have
carried out or was witnessed by a named person, or activities that
someone claimed was recorded on CCTV. In addition, activities
that leave a trace (mobile phone call, text, debit/credit card
purchases, and receipts) are also considered checkable. The effect
that truth tellers report more checkable details than liars becomes
stronger when interviewees are instructed to try to include details
in their statement that the investigator can verify. Following
such a request, truth tellers add more checkable details in their
accounts than liars (22, 23).
Cognitive Credibility Assessment (CCA)
The CCA technique comprises three elements: (i) Imposing
cognitive load; (ii) Asking unexpected questions, and (iii)
Encouraging interviewees to say more (24, 25).
(i) Cognitive credibility assessment: Imposing cognitive load.
fMRI research has shown that in interviews lying is typicallymore
cognitively demanding than telling the truth (26). Investigators
can exploit this difference in cognitive load by making additional
requests that will further increase the cognitive load truth tellers
and liars experience [such as gripping an object while telling a
story, (27)]. Since liars’ mental resources are already depleted by
the act of lying, they find it more difficult than truth tellers to cope
with such additional requests (27) and the additional requests
may also impair their story telling (28).
(ii) Cognitive credibility assessment: Asking unexpected
questions. Liars often prepare themselves for interviews by
planning answers to possible questions (7). This planning makes
sense as planned answers often contain fewer cues to deceit
than spontaneous answers (1). However, there is a weakness:
Liars cannot know which questions will be asked. Investigators
can exploit this weakness by asking a mixture of anticipated
and unanticipated questions. Liars find it easier to answer
the anticipated questions than the unanticipated questions,
because they can give their planned answers to the former
but not to the latter (29). For truth tellers, the difficulty
in answering anticipated and unanticipated questions should
be less pronounced. The most straightforward application of
this technique is by interviewing pairs of suspects individually
and comparing their answers to the expected and unexpected
questions. Pairs of truth tellers showed similar overlap in their
answers to expected questions as pairs of liars, but the pairs of
truth tellers showed more overlap in their answers to unexpected
questions than pairs of liars (30, 31). Another comparison can
also be made: Comparing the overlap between expected and
unexpected questions within pairs of truth tellers andwithin pairs
of liars. Pairs of truth tellers showed a similar overlap in their
answers to the expected and unexpected questions, whereas pairs
of liars showed more overlap in their answers to the expected
questions than in their answers to the unexpected questions (31).
(iii) Cognitive credibility assessment: Encouraging
interviewees to say more. In interview settings, truth tellers
typically do not provide spontaneously all the information they
hold in their memory (32, 33). There are two reasons for this, a
cognitive reason and a social reason.
Regarding the cognitive reason: Interviewees are unable to
retrieve spontaneously all the information from their memory.
Memory recall can be enhanced by using mnemonics of which
asking interviewees to sketch while talking is an example (15).
Sketching while narrating elicits additional information in truth
tellers (34–36). Vrij et al. (37) provide four reasons for this.
First, sketching is a method to mentally reinstate the context of
the interviewee’s experience and context reinstatement enhances
memory recall. Second, sketching is a visual output which makes
it more compatible with visually experienced events than the
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traditional oral output. Sketching facilitates recalling visual or
spatial information (15), which is often the type of information
interviewees discuss. Third, making a sketch is a time consuming
activity. This will result in the interviewee having more time
to think about the event,1 and this enhanced thinking may
improve his/her recall of the event. Fourth, the request to sketch
automatically leads to obtaining spatial information because each
person/object must be positioned somewhere in the location
someone sketches. Spatial information is not automatically given
in a verbal response, because someone can just report who
were present and which objects were present without reporting
their locations (38). In the only deception experiment to date
in which participants were asked to sketch while narrating (37),
the difference in truth tellers reporting more additional details
than liars was greater in the sketch condition than in the control
condition. Truth tellers are likely to have had a richer memory of
the event than liars, and truth tellers’ richer memory may have
led them to report more new details than liars.
The second reason why truth tellers typically do not provide
spontaneously all the information they know in interview settings
is a social reason: People are uncertain what and how much
information they are expected to provide. The Model Statement
technique addresses this social reason.
THE MODEL STATEMENT TECHNIQUE
In daily life situations social rules imply that people do not report
all the information they know. For example, when someone is
asked by a colleague on Monday morning what s/he did during
the weekend, the answer is likely to be very short: Just a few words
or few sentences highlighting the main activities. Of course,
interviewees will realize in formal interview settings that they
need to provide more information than a few words or sentences,
but they still do not know how much detail they are expected to
provide. One effective way to change truth tellers’ idea about how
much information to provide in an interview setting is to expose
them to a Model Statement, which is an example of a detailed
account unrelated to the topic of the interview (39). The Model
Statement works as a social comparison (40, 41) and has shown
to raise the expectations amongst both truth tellers and liars
about how much information they are expected to (42). A Model
Statement works better than the verbal request “to provide all the
details someone can remember,” perhaps because the former is
a concrete example whereas the latter is an abstract instruction.
It is probably easier for people to follow concrete examples than
abstract instructions (43).
A Model Statement does not just elicit information, it can
also be used for lie detection if certain dependent variables are
analyzed. In the first two Model Statement deception studies
ever published, the Model Statement facilitated the elicitation
of information (39, 44). However, it did so in truth tellers and
liars to a similar extent, which made the technique unsuitable
for lie detection purposes when “total details” was considered as
1Slowing down the output process also makes it easier for the interviewer
to understand the interviewee’s statement, which probably enhances the
communication between interviewer and interviewee.
output variable. This exact pattern of results has been replicated
in six out of seven ensuing studies (42, 43, 45–49), but see Porter
et al. (47) as an exception. In other words, the Model Statement
technique elicits more information in both truth tellers and liars,
but cannot distinguish between truth tellers and liars based on
the total amount of information.
For the Model Statement technique to work as a lie detection
tool it is important to consider the quality rather than the
quantity of information that is reported. The first Model
Statement deception study (39) already hinted at this: Although
truth tellers and liars provided a similar amount of information
after exposure to aModel Statement, the information provided by
truth tellers sounded more plausible than that of liars. That the
quality of details rather than the quantity of details distinguish
truth tellers from liars makes sense. Both truth tellers and liars
realize after exposure to aModel Statement that they are expected
to provide many details (42). The amount of details is thus
unlikely to distinguish between the two groups. The type of
detail becomes relevant because it takes into account the different
cognitive abilities of truth tellers and liars and the different
strategies they use to appear convincing.
Studies to date gave insight into two types of detail that could
distinguish truth tellers from liars after exposure to a Model
Statement, the number of complications (37, 49) and the number
of peripheral details (43) that were reported. A complication
is “an occurrence that makes a situation more difficult than
necessary” (37). Examples of complications are “The sailing race
was canceled, because there was not enough wind” and “When
we arrived at the museum it was closed”; “Initially we did not see
our friend, as he was waiting at a different entrance”) (37, 49).
Complications occur more often in truthful statements than
in deceptive statements (8, 50). In interviews, liars prefer to
keep their stories simple (7), but adding complications makes
the story more complex. A Model Statement increases the
number of complications interviewees report, particularly in
truth tellers (37, 49). Complications are often not about key
aspects of the activities that someone describes, and the story
can be well understood without reporting the complications.
Take for example, when someone describes traveling to a holiday
destination. All sorts of complications that happen en route to
a holiday destination are not necessary to understand the travel
to the holiday destination (someone forgot to bring a valuable
item; taxi turned up late; traffic on the road; airplane delayed; late
gate change at the airport). Therefore, truth tellers may leave at
least some of them out when they are not exposed to a Model
Statement. Liars are reluctant to provide complications in order
to keep their story simple. As a result, truth tellers are more likely
than liars to report more complications after being exposed to a
Model Statement.
A second measure that takes truth tellers’ and liars’ different
strategies into account is distinguishing between core or
peripheral details (43). Core details are details that, if changed,
can result in changes in the basic and most important part
of the story; details that have no such impact are considered
peripheral (51). Thus, if someone describes attending an Adele
pop concert, all details about the actual concert are core details
whereas information about drinks in the pub before and after the
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concert, are peripheral details. Both truth tellers and liars realize
that they need to provide more details after exposure to a Model
Statement (49). Truth tellers, who have actually experienced an
event (e.g., attending an Adele pop concert), will be able to
provide more core and peripheral information, by employing
a “tell it all strategy” (7). For liars, who have not experienced
an event (e.g., did not attend an Adele concert), providing core
information is more difficult and risky. It is difficult because
they have to make up information and it is risky because the
information may provide leads to investigators that they can
check. Thus, liars may avoid providing too many core details
in an attempt to minimize the risk of presenting incriminating
information (6, 21), but may compensate this by providing
peripheral details in an attempt to provide a sufficient amount
of detail. In the only Model Statement deception experiment
distinguishing between core and peripheral details to date, the
latter assumption was supported: In theModel Statement present
condition liars reportedmore peripheral details than truth tellers,
whereas no difference in peripheral details emerged in the control
condition (43).
HOW TO USE A MODEL STATEMENT IN
REAL LIFE
We believe that the Model Statement technique should be used
as a within-subjects technique, as employed by Leal et al. (43).
Thus, first the interviewee should be invited to initially report via
an open-ended question all s/he can remember about the event
under investigation. This should then be followed by a Model
Statement after which the interviewee should again be invited
to report via an open-ended question all s/he can remember, but
this time by taking into account the amount of detail s/he heard
in the Model Statement. Investigators should then listen to the
number of new complications reported in the second recall and
the amount of new peripheral information reported in the second
recall.
Three Practical Elements Merit Attention
First, use a within-subjects structure when applying the Model
Statement technique. Within-subjects comparisons are better
for lie detection purposes than between-subjects comparisons
(52). In a between-subjects comparison, the interviewee would
be asked to report the event only once and to do this after
exposure to the Model Statement. The amount of information
an interviewee provides depends on many factors, including
his/her personality [some people talk more than others (53–55),
the situation (some events are richer in detail than others)
or preparedness for the interview [pre-planned answers often
contain more words than spontaneous answers, e.g. (56)]. In a
within-subjects comparison, it does not matter how detailed an
initial answer is or how many complications someone initially
provides (which is largely influenced by personality, situation
and preparedness). The only relevant measure is the number of
peripheral details and complications that are added (more likely
to be influenced by veracity).
Second, the Model Statement should be unrelated to the topic
of investigation so that it does not give liars the chance to “copy”
the example and use it in their own statement. In our research,
we use a 734 words Model Statement in which a young man
describes his experiences when attending a Formula 2motor race,
commencing where the drivers go to their grid position prior to
the start of the race. This is an atypical event that does not give
interviewees the opportunity to copy details.
Third, our Model Statement is an authentic experience
(the person really attended a Formula 2 motor race), which
we think is important. True experiences sound more realistic
than made-up experiences and are therefore more powerful.
It becomes even worse when someone fabricates a model
statement on the spot. It typically is not detailed enough
and often sounds what it actually is: a made-up story.
We always present the Model Statement in the format of
an audiotape. However, other ways to present the Model
Statement are possible. We return to this point in the next
section.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Unfortunately, many lie detection techniques are taught to
practitioners without solid empirical evidence to back them up,
which we consider a particularly poor and potentially harmful
practice (12, 57). Many research avenues for Model Statement
deception research are possible. We will conclude this article by
discussing five more research ideas in somewhat more detail.
First, an obvious but important research endeavor would be
replication of studies that have been carried out so far, ideally
by different groups of researchers in different labs. Most Model
Statement research to date comes from Vrij’s lab but much
stronger conclusions could be drawn if Vrij’s lab findings are
replicated in other labs. This refers in particular to research
related to complications and core/peripheral details, as research
in that area is still scarce. At the same time, those researchers
could then search for other variables than complications or
peripheral details on which truth tellers and liars may differ after
exposure to a Model Statement.
Second, research should be carried out manipulating the
content of the Model Statement. Will it have an effect
on interviewees’ recall? People experience activities through
their perceptual senses: They see, hear, touch, smell, or taste
things. An event interviewees are asked to describe may
contain more information about some of these perceptual
sources than about others. Will it help or hinder lie detection
if interviewees are exposed to a Model Statement that
corresponds with their perceptual experience? For example,
if the experience the interviewee talks about contains many
auditory experiences, will it then be beneficial to use a
Model Statement that focuses on auditory experiences? On
the one hand it may help truth tellers to recall more
details they have experienced through the particular sense(s)
emphasized in the Model Statement but, on the other hand,
it may give liars an idea what type of information to
fabricate.
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Third, thus far we have always used an audiotaped Model
Statement. This could be played via a loudspeaker but also from
a mobile phone. Alternatives are that the investigator reads out
an example or that interviewees read a written text of a Model
Statement. Until tested it is unclear which—if any—modality
works best for discriminating between truth tellers and liars.
Fourth, from training we give in the Model Statement
technique (58), we know that interviewees quickly understand
that they are requested to provide more details than they initially
thought they had to provide. This may result in different mental
processes in truth tellers and liars. Adding information should
be easier for truth tellers than for liars, as truth tellers can go
back to their memory, whereas liars have to think what made-
up details to add to their stories. Consequently, liars may listen
less to the content of the Model Statement than truth tellers,
because liars cannot listen to the Model Statement and think
of details to add at the same time. If so, truth tellers and liars
might be able to report back the content of the initial part of
the Model Statement to an equal extent as at the initial stage
both are listening to the Model Statement. However, after this
stage, liars should switch off and start thinking about the details
they will add. From this point onwards, we expect liars to report
back less of the content of the Model Statement than truth
tellers.
Fifth, a meta-analysis summarizing Cognitive Interview
research showed that “report everything” instructions result in
interviewees reporting more information without a reduction in
accuracy (59). We expect a Model Statement also to have this
effect on truth tellers—more information without a reduction in
accuracy—but believe that this issue is important enough to be
examined empirically.
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